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THE LEGAL STATUS OF BCCI: UNWARRANTED
AD-HocIsm, CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES AND THE
PRESSING NEED FOR A CRICKET-LEGISLATION
Aditya Sondhi*
"What do they know of cricket, who only cricket know?"
- C.L.R. James

The Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms rejected the contention that the Board of
Controlfor Cricket in India comes within the scope ofthe definition of'State' as
defined in Article 12 ofthe Constitution.The Court, by a 3:2 majority, came to
the conclusion that the BCCI is essentiallyan autonomous non-statutorybody
with no declared monopoly over the game of cricket, no publicfunction to
discharge,no significantfinancial assistancefrom the Government and not
being subject to what could be describedas 'deep and pervasive control' by the
Government. This paperseeks to analyse the more significantconsequences of
such apregnant and peculiarposition oflaw whereby the BCCI remains a nonState entity despite the Union ofIndia viewing it as a state actor.It dwells on the
needfor legislativeaction to set right an anomaly that is now obtainingin the
sphere ofcricket in India, as much as it is in sports law at large.
I.
II.

BACKDROP

......................................................

112

PROGNOSIS

.....................................................

113

IlI.

WHY THE Bcci

IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSER
V.

EPILOGUE

..................................

114

...............................................

119

OUGHT TO BE 'STATE'

.................................................

.....

121

Aditya Sondhi is an Advocate practicing in the High Court of Karnataka and the
Supreme Court of India. He is an alumnus of the National Law School of India
University, Bangalore, where he has gone back and taught Constitutional Law,
Company Law, Professional Ethics and Arbitration.

111

Vol. 22(2)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2010

I. BACKDROP
While the ongoing Indian Premier League [hereinafter "IPL"] fiasco has
assumed bizarre proportions, one is bemused to learn that despite its rather
overbearing name -'Board of Control for Cricket in India' [hereinafter "BCCI"]
and its rather imperious status of being "the single national governing body for
all cricket in India,"' the BCCI is, by its own reckoning, a mere private,
autonomous entity with no public mandate or governmental control. The case
in point is the stand taken by the BCCI in the case of Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of
India,2 wherein the BCCI opposed the writ petition filed against it in a matter
pertaining to grant of exclusive television rights for cricket matches on the
preliminary ground that it (the BCCI) was not 'State' within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India.' Curiously, the stand of the BCCI ran
diametrically opposite to the stand taken by the Union of India in the said
proceedings, wherein the Union filed a counter-affidavit contending, inter alia,
that the BCCI is 'State', in that the BCCI has always been subjected to the de
facto control and recognition of the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport as the
national apex body for cricket in India, that the team selected by the BCCI
represents the country as the official Indian team, that the permission of the
Government of India is required (and indeed sought) by the BCCI for visiting
foreign teams and that the BCCI has a public function, being accountable to the
Government and to the people of India at large.
It is fait accompli that in Zee Telefilms, the Supreme Court of India, by a 3:2
verdict ruled that BCCI is not 'State', being essentially an autonomous nonstatutory body with no declared monopoly over the game of cricket, no public
function to discharge, no significant financial assistance from the Government
and not being subject to what could be described as 'deep and pervasive control'
by the Government. 4 Consequently, the writ petition filed under Article 32 was
dismissed as 'not maintainable' against the BCCI.

1
2

4

See www.bcci/tv/about-bcci.html.
Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649 (Supreme Court of India)
[hereinafter "Zee Telefilms"].
"Definition. - In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State' includes
the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the
Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India." Constitution
of India, 1950, Art. 12.
See supra note 4, at 1 23.
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The stand taken by the BCCI and its endorsement by the Supreme Court has
resulted in the BCCI being equated with any other private organisation that is
subject to the competition laws of India,5 thereby exposing it and its policies to
the scrutiny of the Competition Commission and to litigation by competitors,
such as the Subash Chandra-controlled, beleaguered Indian Cricket League
[hereinafter "ICL"]. The erstwhile Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission had, in fact, initiated an inquiry against the BCCI for restrictive and
unfair trade practices on account of the initiation of action against and the refusal
to consider players who opted for the ICL as well as its refusal to share
infrastructure such as cricket grounds with other interested parties. This
development is not surprising, and, if anything, was inevitable as the BCCI itself
conceded before the Supreme Court that "there is no law which prohibits the
coming into existence of any other parallel organisation" making way, thereby,
for competition and the application of competition laws.
While the decision of the BCCI in taking such a position is debatable, and
liable to being criticised for being cavalier and self-defeating, drawing from the
judgement of the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms, this paper seeks to analyse the
more significant consequences of such a pregnant and peculiar position of law
whereby the BCCI remains a non-State entity despite the Union of India viewing
it as a state actor. The paper does not enter into a syncretic exercise of reconciling
the two positions; nor does it enter into a criticism of the decision in Zee Telefilms
(though it must be stated that the weighty dissenting judgement of Justice S. B.
Sinha is jurist's delight), but instead dwells on the need for legislative action to
set right an anomaly that is now obtaining in the sphere of cricket in India, as
much as it is in sports law at large.

II.

PROGNOSIS

In view of the preliminary comments above, the hypothesis that one begins
with is that the BCCI (or any other organisation that officially governs and
promotes cricket in India) ought to be 'State', an objective that can be directly
achieved by the Government of India by enacting a law to deal with the
establishment (or recognition, as the case may be) of such a body and its powers
and functions. This obviates any discussion as to whether the BCCI, which is
today the sole entity 'officially' controlling cricket in India vis-A-vis the International

6

Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003. The Act repealed and replaced the Monopolies
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, No. 54 of 1969.
See supra note 4, at 1 3.
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Cricket Council [hereinafter "ICC"], is 'State' on account of its being any 'other
authority' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, as once it is
a statutory authority, it automatically falls within the meaning of Article 12
becoming thereby subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and Article 32 in cases of violation of fundamental rights, and obligated to
act fairly and reasonably within the meaning of Article 14 thereof, inter alia.
Two important caveats:
One, for the sake of convenience, this paper proceeds on the basis that the
BCCI is the sole body that controls cricket in India as far as the Government of
India is concerned. The arguments applied herein as to why the BCCI ought to be
'State' could be equally applied to any new entity that the Government of India
chooses to establish or recognize by legislation.
Two, that the proposed status of BCCI as 'State' that one discusses herein is
'State' as a statutory authority and not merely as any 'other authority', particularly
as the latter question is no longer res integra in view of the judgment in Zee Telefilms.

III. WHY

THE BCCI OUGHT TO BE 'STATE'

The dissenting judgment of Sinha, J.7 in Zee Telefilms seeks to answer this
question from various perspectives, and it is apposite to dwell on these at the
very outset. One test of a private body which could be 'State' is whether the said
private body is "allowed to discharge public duty or positive obligation of a
public nature and furthermore is allowed to perform regulatory and controlling
functions and activities which were otherwise the job of the Government." I That
being the case, the nature of the function performed by a private body simpliciter
could elevate it to the status of 'State', regardless of the financial, functional and/
or administrative control by the Government. For instance, the decision of a
Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka9 in holding the Bangalore
International Airport Limited [hereinafter "BIAL"] to be 'State' proceeded
essentially on account of the activities carried out by it, namely airport activities,
which bear the stamp of 'public function'.o
The minority judgment was given by S.B. Sinha & S. N. Variava, JJ.

10

Supra note 4, at 1 70 (citing Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical
Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111 (Supreme Court of India)).
Judgment dated December 19, 2008 passed in W.R No. 14215/2006.
A Special Leave Petition has been preferred against the said judgment and is
pending before the Supreme Court.
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With the BCCI one finds an entity allowed, de facto, by the State to represent
the country in international fora. There has never really been any dispute with
regard to the fact that the 'Indian' team selected by the BCCI is, ipso facto, the
team representing the country and that the players so selected duly represent
India, wearing national colours at most times. Of course, this position also flows
from the fact that the ICC recognises the BCCI as the 'official' body representing
India," but the fact remains that neither the Government of India nor any
alternative body, and nor, for that matter, the BCCI itself have ever sought to
revoke or challenge this status. As such, the BCCI, maybe unwittingly but
irrefutably, has assumed a monopoly status that includes its absolute right to
regulate and control the sport of cricket in India and significantly the rights of
the citizens as regards their participation therein with a view to ultimately
representing the nation. These facts by themselves are sufficient to conclude that
there is a dimension of 'public function' in the activities of the BCCI.
Moreover, one cannot lose sight of the fact that cricket assumes manic
proportions in India and cannot be viewed as being merely a sport or an ordinary
amusement activity. The ground-realities of the popularity and reach of the sport
of cricket in India make for a compelling argument that there is a patent 'public'
element to the same. An international game of cricket played in India today brings
into its fold various spheres of activity, which, collectively, have an uncanny
resemblance to 'State' activity. These include:
(a)

the regulation of the right of the viewers to witness the match on television
and other media such as the internet;

(b)

the right of the public to attend and witness the match at the stadium by
purchasing tickets for value including their right to enter the stadium upon
complying with security protocols and their right to remain in the stadium
subject to compliance with the ICC Anti-Racism Codel2 and general laws of
nuisance;

(c)

the right of players to partake in the match subject to self-imposed
standards of fitness, competence and discipline, coupled with the ICC

"

Supra note 4, at J[ 189 (referring to the Articles of Association of the ICC which

define 'Cricket Authority' to mean "a body (whether incorporated or not) which is
recognised by the Council as the governing body responsible for the administration,
12

management and development of cricket in a cricket-playing country..."
For the text of ICC's Anti-Racism Code, see ICC Anti-Racism Code for Players and
Player Support Personnel, available at http://static.icc-cricket.yahoo.net/ugc/
documents DOCAF7ED11CO0109A7FB946A612A2FC5AAE_1263123600153_706.pdf.
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regulations in respect of 'doping' or using banned performance-enhancing
substances and general discipline as codified under the ICC Code of Conduct
for Players as well as the restrictions on addressing the media by a selfimposed code;
(d)

the provision of security for the players, which has assumed far-fetched
proportions in the wake of the terror threat to high-profile cricketers and
tournaments;

(e)

the provision of security and order to the spectators, with tens of thousands
of lives at risk to riots, stampedes, terror and natural disasters such as fires;

(f)

the control and management of infrastructure relating to the match such
as the stadia and seating;

(g)

the regulation of ancillary activities such as awarding of television
contracts, team franchises, endorsements, distribution of prize money and
public relations.

Many, if not all, of the above individually could have traces of a public function,
and taken in their totality leave one astounded that all this and more is
implemented by a 'private' body sans any regulation or law or control by the
Government. The BCCI hence exclusively controls not only the sport itself but
also the formulation of its policy and purport and so also its implementation. The
BCCI has assumed to itself the unbridled right to regulate and control the game of
cricket in India and also, significantly, the careers of those associated with it at
various levels. But, as it is not 'State' it is not incumbent upon it to act fairly and
reasonably within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution. This is a shocking
incongruity that cries out for legislative correction.
Coupled with the aforesaid, is the fact that, ironically, the Union of India
maintains that it has granted the BCCI the implied permission to operate as the
sole cricketing federation, and thereby granted it de facto recognition.14 However,
in the light of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms and in the

13

14

See ICC Code of Conduct for Players and Player Support Personnel, available at
http://static.icc-cricket.yahoo.net/ugc/documents/DOCAF7ED11COO109
A7FB946A612A2FC5AAE_1263123890451_791.pdf.
Supra note 4, at 1 201 (per S.B. Sinha, J., dissenting) ("It is true that no document has
been produced establishing grant of such recognition (by the Union of India to
BCCI); but the documents on record leave no manner of doubt that the Board had
asked for and the Union of India had granted de facto recognition."). (Emphasis
Supplied)
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absence of any legislation governing the same, the BCCI could easily become (and
some feel it already is) an unruly horse with no sense of accountability or control.
For instance, in view of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, the Ministry of External
Affairs resolved to put on hold all diplomatic and 'extra-curricular' interaction
with Pakistan, including calling off the proposed cricket series with the old rival.
While the BCCI went along with this decision, the fact remains that, theoretically,
it could have turned a blind eye to the decision of the Union of India and proceeded
with the tour to Pakistan with no sanction to follow.'" This could not only have
far-reaching ramifications internationally, but also indicates the status of the
sport of cricket as a matter of public policy and a tool of 'Track B' diplomacy.
Another intriguing aspect is the 'human rights' facet introduced in the
judgment of Sinha, J. Noticing the fact that the BCCI's activities
impinge upon the fundamental rights of the players and other
persons as also the rights, hopes and aspirations of the cricket-loving
public, the right to see the game of cricket live or on television ... and
that its actions may disable a person from pursuing his vocation
and in that process subject a citizen to hostile discrimination or
impose an embargo which would make or mar a player's career... 6
the BCCI assumes a 'state-like' identity that could adversely affect the
fundamental rights of the citizens involved (as players, umpires, administrators,
coaches, spectators and viewers), and so also their human right to development
that would take within its fold the enjoyment of sport as participants or as viewers.
And if one needed further conviction to seriously consider a legal statutory
regime over the game of cricket, one need only refer to the balance sheets of the
BCCI. No sport, and perhaps no other singular activity, generates as much revenue
as the game of cricket of India. A whopping US $ 308 million were the stakes
involved in the grant of television rights in the Zee Telefilms case! The official
figures from the 2010 IPL are exponentially higher. The highest endorsementroyalty earners and among the highest tax-payers in the country are the
Tendulkars and the Dhonis, who earn more than their daily bread via the BCCI.
The IPL is a ticking bomb, as recent developments have disclosed. The BCCI
enjoys an economy of scale that could equate it to a small nation - a fact that in
tandem with the other factors enumerated above, warrants legislative control
and supervision of cricket in India.
15

16

In fact, the BCCI has always sought to adhere to the Foreign Policy of India,
suggestive of its 'public' demeanour.
Supra note 4, at 1247, 164-165 & 136 (per S. B. Sinha, J., dissenting)
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Besides, the Government of the land also needs to take notice of the fact that
with the'official' revenues associated with the game of cricket, there is an infinite,
organised 'black market' dealing in betting on cricket. While the Indian
Government has pangs of morality that prevent it from legalising betting on
sport in India, it has had no qualms in letting the betting market remain largely
untouched by law. Apart from the stray arrests of bookies around the World Cup
or other prominent tournaments for ordinary Indian Penal Code, 7 bailable and
pro-accused offences and related offences under the archaic Indian Public
Gambling Act, 1867, the Government remains oblivious to the episodes of moneylaundering and havala that such volumes of money bring with them. There is
cause to suspect that the organised mafia that operates such betting is the same
mafia that possibly aids and abets the fidayeen funds. And we still pretend that
cricket is just a game!
Added to betting, is the menace of 'match-fixing', a conundrum that always
remained unsaid but explicitly reared its ugly head in Indian cricket in 2000 as a
result of the Hansiegate confessions and the suspension of leading cricketers,
including former captains Mohammed Azharuddin and Ajay Jadeja. 8 The fact
remains that there is no offence under the IPC or for that matter any other law till
date, which expressly makes match-fixing an offence. The police authorities
sought to prosecute the accused under section 420 of the IPC for cheating the
public at large, as the spectators could be said to have been 'dishonestly induced
to part with their property', i.e., their cash towards a purchase of a ticket, on the
premise that the match would be played out fairly and on merit, and, but for
such an assurance, would have never paid for the said ticket. (The Central Bureau
of Investigation [hereinafter "CBI"] also explored the possibility of prosecuting
Mohammed Azharuddin and Ajay Sharma under the provisions of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988, as they were employed with Public Sector Undertakings
[hereinafter "PSU"] - State Bank of India and Central Warehousing Corporation,
respectively but clearly neither was acting in the course of his employment or
otherwise as a 'public servant' when the misdemeanour occurred). While such a
legal strategy is arguable, rather than rely upon such tangential interpretation, which
heavily depends on spectator-support to arrive at a conviction, the Government
would be well-served to conjure up an enactment specifically dealing with the same.

17

Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45 of 1860 [hereinafter"IPC"].

18

For the text of the Report of K. Madhavan, former Director of the Central Bureau

of Investigation on match-fixing in India, see Central Bureau of Investigation,
Report on Cricket Match-Fixing and Related Malpractices, (2000), available at
www.yehhaicricket.com/madhavansreport/madhavansreportl.html.
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Rather than intervene in the functioning of the BCCI in a circuitous manner,
as has been recently done through income-tax raids, enquiries through the
Registrar of Companies etc, the Government of India ought to vindicate its stand
taken before the Supreme Court by enacting a law to deal with the establishment
(or recognition, as the case may be) of such a national cricket body and its powers
and functions. Until such a comprehensive enactment sees the light of day,
'friendly pitch-reports will continue to be disseminated by the Shane Warnes
and the Mark Waughs of the cricketing world for a price and the game cricket will
continue to be abused en masse.

IV. THE

CONSTITUTIONAL POSER

While the arguments in favour of a legislation to deal with cricket and all its
dimensions are compelling, the fact remains that 'sports' is a matter falling under
the State List contained in Schedule 7 to the Constitution of India.19 That being the
case, prima facie, the Union of India has no legislative competence to make a
central law on the subject. And leaving it to the States to legislate on cricket,
particularly in respect of the matters arising in the context discussed above, is
likely to boomerang, with there being divergent and possibly conflicting State
enactments, with hydra-headed power centres, territorial limitations and no
central body or law to uniformly govern the game of cricket in its many avatars.
This would, clearly, compound the problem.
As such, one needs to seek solutions that meet the end of having a central
Union law on the subject. One option that presents itself is contained in Article
249 of the Constitution of India20 whereby the Rajya Sabha could propose a
resolution with a two-thirds majority of those present and voting that the
Parliament legislate on the sport of cricket, being a matter of necessity and/or
expediency in national interest, in which case Parliament is conferred the
19

20

Constitution of India, 1950, Entry 33, List II, Schedule 7. It reads as follows "Theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas subject to the provisions of entry
60 of List 1; sports, entertainments and amusements." (Emphasis supplied)
"Power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter in the State List in the
national interest. - (1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this
Chapter, if the Council of States has declared by resolution supported by not less
than two-thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient
in national interest that Parliament should make laws with respect to any matter
enumerated in the State List specified in the resolution, it shall be lawful for
Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with
respect to that matter while the resolution remains in force." Constitution of India,
1950, Art. 249.
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constitutional power to make a central law respecting the same. Such legislation
can remain in force until such time as the resolution remains effective. Though
the life-span of such a resolution is one-year (plus a buffer of six months on its
expiry), vide Article 249(2) the same is renewable ad nauseam for recurring
periods of one year each.
No doubt, such a method requires great political will and purpose. But
Article 249 has been pressed into service on earlier occasions21 and in the given
scenario, the facts speak for themselves and command an urgent reaction from
the law-makers. Once achieved, any Government in power for a period of fiveyears with the support of the Council of States can readily overcome the
constitutional hurdle to enact such a law.
Per contra, Parliament can consider amending Schedule 7 to introduce
sports' as an entry in the Concurrent List,22 or for that matter, in the Union List.
A reference to the National Sports Policy, 2001 makes it abundantly clear that the
Union of India through the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports was fully
cognizant of this matter. The said policy, inter alia, provides as follows:
While the broad-basing of Sports will, primarily remain a
responsibility of the State Governments, the Union Government
will actively supplement their efforts in this direction and for taping
the latent talent, including in the rural and tribal areas. The Union
Government and the Sports Authority of India (SAI), in association
with the Indian Olympic Association and the National Sports
Federations, will focus specific attention on the objective of achieving
excellence at the national and international levels.
The question of inclusion of "sports" in the Concurrent List of the
Constitution of India and introduction of appropriate legislation
for guiding all matters involving national and inter-state
jurisdiction, will be pursued.23 (Emphasis supplied)

21

See Supply and Prices of Goods Act, 1950, No. 70 of 1950 and Evacuee Interest
(Separation) Act, 1951, No. 64 of 1951. The Water (Prevention and Control of

Pollution) Act, 1974, No. 6 of 1974 came to be enacted invoking Article 252 of the
Constitution whereby some states passed resolutions that the matters covered
by the State List relating to water pollution could be regulated in the said states by
22

23

Parliament by law.
As was sought to be done by the 61s Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1988, which is
now on the verge of being withdrawn.
See 1 5 and 6, National Sports Policy, 2001, available at http://www.yas.nic.in/
index2.asp?linkid=67&slid=86&sublinkid=188&langid=1.
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Seven years later, the stated policy of the Union of India to pursue the
requisite Constitutional amendment and consequential legislation remains
confined to the annals of its ministries, or perhaps, to the caches of their
websites.
Clearly, an amendment to Schedule 7 by removing an entry from List 2 to
List 3 is a delicate and elaborate process, requiring the ratification by the States
whose seisin stands vitiated to that extent.24 However, the provisions of Schedule
7 have seen numerous amendments earlier and one such proposed amendment is
not improbable, especially in a matter of national importance.

V. EPILOGUE
While certain constitutional hurdles undoubtedly exist (as detailed above),
one finds that they are not insurmountable and ought to be overcome with
alacrity to provide for an umbrella-legislation that brings Indian cricket under a
statutory regime of the BCCI (or any other national body) as well as tackles
related issues that arise in terms of awarding of tenders, selection of players,
players' contracts, security & discipline and so also, penal matters of betting and
match-fixing in the sport. Cricket is larger than life in India and warrants such a
holistic legislative response. The march of the law demands that Government
constantly take cognizance of the realities and developments in its territory and
respond to the challenges and threats that arise periodically. One has seen

24

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Constitution of India, Art. 368(2). It mandatorily provides that "an amendment of
this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose
in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a
majority of the total membership of that House and by majority of not less than
two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented
to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon the Constitution
shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change inArticle 54, Article 555, Article 73, Article 162 or Article 241, or
Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or
Any of the Lists in Seventh Schedule, or
The representation of States in Parliament, or
The provisions of this Article,
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than
one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those Legislatures
before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President
for assent." (Emphasis supplied)
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legislation dealing with technological developments in India in the information
technology, telecommunications and intellectual property spheres of late, with
regulators entering the fray. Legislative responses to ownership and enjoyment
of property are also found frequently, as are responses to various other matters of
public interest.
However, when it comes to sport, there is still a perceivably apathetic
approach, conveniently brushing it aside as a means of amusement and ignoring
the massive financial, professional and national elements involved, particularly
in a sport such as cricket. In India, national pride, as indeed patriotism, is often
driven by cricketing results and support, and this strongly lends itself to the
urgent attention of the legislators. Other compelling factors for such a response
have been set out in the course of the discussion above. If one draws a parallel, the
other facets that touch the lives of Indians at large as much as cricket are probably
the stock-market and, more recently, the real-estate market. While the former
has come under due legislative regulation by the enactment of the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 and, later, by the establishment of the Securities
and Exchange Board of India [hereinafter "SEBI"] under the Securities and Exchange
Board of India Act, 1992, the latter still remains unregulated. Now, if one analyses
the impact that the real-estate industry has had on urban India, it is appalling that
this sector remains totally unregulated (but for scattered apartment-ownership
and registration laws) and is left to the ordinary civil law and Civil Courts (or
Consumer Fora) to deal with the multiple and complex issues that arise in its fold.
However, it is learnt that a Real Estate Regulator established under an associated
legislation - the Real Estate Management (Control and Regulation) Bill - is on the
cards, under the auspices of the Ministry of Urban Development.
Similarly, cricket in India has reached proportions where it can no longer be
left to the whimsical decision-making of private bodies or to the 'one-size-fits-all'
regulations of the ICC. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms by a narrow 3:2
majority has held the BCCI to not be 'State' within the meaning of the Indian
Constitution (the ramifications of which are exhaustively detailed above), but
the said decision does not preclude Parliament from filling the void by passing an
appropriate law on the subject. It is true that other prominent cricket-playing
countries like England and Australia continue to be governed by non-statutory
bodies, 25 the English & Wales Cricket Board and Cricket Australia, respectively,
25

For a detailed discussion on the scope of public law vis-t-vis sports federations in
international jurisdictions, see supra note 4, at 1 106-124.
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but the preeminent position that India enjoys in world cricket is reason enough
for her to take the lead in legislating on the subject. After all, the pure financial
clout that the BCCI (and by default, India) enjoys with the ICC is palpable, be it in
the matter of tour-schedules, telecast rights or for that matter, hearings in matters
of indiscipline affecting Harbhajan Singh!
The more apposite comparison is to, say, football in Brazil, where the sport
is a veritable national way of life, just as cricket is in India. Brazil has had a
formal sports law in place since 1941 and has more recently codified the 'Zico
Law' in 1993 and the 'Pele Law' in 2001. Indulgent as the names may seem, the
laws are far-sighted, dealing with matters ranging from players' and spectatorinsurance, players' contracts, labour issues, formulation of leagues, et al. In India,
though the Union Government as per its affidavit in Zee Telefilms considers the
BCCI as the de facto recognised exclusive organisation for the regulation and
management of cricket, there is still no law in place to codify the same, despite the
contention of the Union of India being rejected by the Supreme Court and a
yawning hole existing in a matter of public law. In this exercise, the Union needs
to also address the observations of the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms that if BCCI
is treated as 'State', then other sports federations in India would also be treated
as such, else Article 14 could be found violated and the BCCI discriminated
against. 26 Apart from the fact that the said observations constitute obiter dicta,
and are made in the context of interpreting whether or not the BCCI is 'State' as
contemplated by our Constitution, in a matter of creating a statutory regulator
and regime for the sport of cricket, the Union of India would be on a strong wicket
(pun intended) to treat cricket differently from other sports in India, say, golf or
shooting, and on this intelligible differentia request the Court to take judicial
notice of the special status enjoyed by the sport and the macro challenges
presented by it in its modem avatar, in the eventuality of a challenge being brought
to such an enactment before the courts by the BCCI or any other person.
Ultimately, the prevalent ad-hocism in the management of Indian cricket is
unacceptable to a jurist and a cricket-fan alike, and the time is ripe for the Union
Government to rise to the occasion by propounding an original and exhaustive
piece of legislation that addresses the issues facing India's national pastime (though
hockey still remains our national sport!). Such a step would be a giant leap for the
development of sports law in India and make her a torchbearer for the rest of the
global cricketing community.

26

Supra note 4, at 1 34 (Santosh Hegde, J., concurring).
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EXISTENCE

AND RELEVANCE OF THE MCDOWELL RULE:

USE OF THE CORPORATION AS A VEHICLE OF TAX
PLANNING IN LIGHT OF VODAFONE AND THE DIRECT
TAXES CODE
Sanjit R. Rajayer*

This paperseeks to ascertainthe existence of a rule of law emergingfrom the
McDowell case and to place it in the context of the developingjurisprudenceon
tax avoidance in India.In doing so, the authoralso seeks to analyse the effect of
the 'rule' on recent developments such as the decision of the Bombay High
Court in the Vodafone case and the Direct Tax Code Bill, 2009, set to come
intoforce in April 2011. Having examined the essence ofthe'rule' in McDowell,
it is sought to be argued that the rule is infact merely a rule in relationto the
natureofanalysis to be undertakenby the court and not a specific determination
or test to ascertainwhich transactionsarepermissibleand which are not, in the
context of tax avoidance. Having established this, it isfurthersuggested that
the relevance of the McDowell judgment as a whole must be seen in light of
the landscapeof taxgovernancein India.In doing so, two conflictingapproaches
emerge; the 'textualist' approachand the 'purposivist'approach. This paper
seeks to demonstratethatwhile the concurringjudgment in McDowell and the
DTCfall squarelywithin the purposivistapproach,the textualist approachis
evinced in the classicalformulation ofthe Westminster case. However,both
these approachesareflawed and have been invoked,from time to time, by the
judiciaryand the legislature,as a reaction to one another.Therefore, there is a
needfor a median approach,which is to befound in the 'purposivetextualism'
appliedin two landmark Englishcases. On an analysis ofVodafone and the
Azadi Bachao Andolan cases, this paper concludes that these casesfollow this
new approach,and infact, the development of this approachcan be tracedback
to cases succeedingMcDowell, as well as the'rule'in McDowell as enunciated
herein. Therefore,all these cases can be seen as partofa common thread,which
is usefulfor courts and the legislatureto apply. This approachmerits serious
considerationnot only because it lays down clear standardsfor courts tofollow,
but alsofor lawyers, which will have a significantpositive impacton the very
behaviourofcorporations.
*
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The rule in McDowell's Case' [hereinafter"McDowell"] has been the source of
significant controversy in the area of tax governance. While on one hand, it may
seem to have completely changed the face of fiscal jurisprudence and tax planning
in India, some writers are of the opinion that it has in fact had no such result and is
merely a judicial aberration in the otherwise cogent exposition of fiscal principles
by the Supreme Court. 2 Indeed, judicial pronouncements after McDowell have also
contributed to the confusion surrounding the position of law on tax planning, and
have resulted in significantly divergent views on what is as well as what should be
permissible in the determination of tax liability through transactions undertaken
by the assessee. Therefore, it is submitted that in order to ascertain the exact effect
of the judicial pronouncements in question, it is imperative that much of the gloss
that surrounds them be stripped away to reveal the answer to two questions;
what the court sought to do and what the court in fact did.
It is with this view that this paper seeks to analyse some of the epochal
judgments of the Supreme Court in the area of tax governance and to study the
effects of these judgments, as well as those of the Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2009
[hereinafter "DTC"], on the position of the corporation as a vehicle of tax planning.
The first part of this paper examines the true essence of the rule in McDowell and
seeks to contextualize the court's anxiety to evolve such a rule. The second part
discusses the relevance of the rule and seeks to provide a contextual framework
for the subsequent discussion, locating the judicial pronouncements in the
McDowell, Union ofIndia v. Azadi Bachao Andolan,' [hereinafter"Azadi"] and Vodafone
InternationalHoldings v. Union of India' [hereinafter "Vodafone"] cases within the
abovementioned contextual matrix. The third part of this paper examines judicial
and legislative responses to tax evasion and suggests that 'purposive textualism'
may be the most desirable approach to address the question. By extending the
logic of this approach, in conclusion, the author makes two propositions; firstly,
that while McDowell, Azadi and Vodafone seem divergent in their approach, a proper
reading of the McDowell rule does not evince such divergence in approach and
secondly, that the DTC ought to adopt a similar approach to that emerging from

McDowell & Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1986 SC 649 (Supreme Court
2

of India).
See NANi PALKHIVALA ET AL.,
ed., 2004) [hereinafter

3

THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAX

66 (9 h edn., Dinesh Vyas

"PALKHIVALA"].

Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, [2003] 263 ITR 706 (Supreme Court of

India).
4

Vodafone International Holdings v. Union of India, [2009] 311 ITR 46 (High Court of
Bombay).
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the foregoing discussion to avoid the problem of over-breadth, which it currently
suffers from.
The first thing that is noticeable on a reading of the McDowell judgment is
that the controversial opinion of Reddy J. is not the binding majority opinion, but
rather a concurring judgment. This fact is significant to ascertain the 'rule' in
McDowell and must be kept in mind while considering its true effect. The second
noticeable point is that the question before the court in that case was simply
whether Excise Duty paid by the wholesale buyers of liquor should be considered
as part of the'turnover', chargeable to Sales Tax in the hands of the manufacturer.
The court answered this question by applying the fundamental principle that
"...it is immaterial to enquire how the total amount charged as consideration is
made up and whether it consists of excise duty or sales tax or freight..."' and on
a plain reading of the definition of 'turnover' under the Sales Tax Act. Therefore,
the ratio of the case was simply that the Excise duty paid by the buyers could be
considered as a part of the turnover and hence should be chargeable to Sales Tax
under the relevant provisions of the Act.
Now, it was in response to two contentions forwarded by the appellants
that the majority made some observations about the question of tax evasion.
First, the Court rejected the 'common till theory', holding it inapplicable as a
general rule to the question of what must be included within 'turnover' and
observed that if this theory was accepted, the buyer and seller could enter into an
agreement to keep out of the'common till' (and therefore the turnover chargeable
to tax) any amount which would ordinarily constitute 'consideration proper',
and thereby reduce their tax liability. Secondly, and which is central to the theme
of this paper, the Court addressed the 'legitimacy' argument, commenting that
while tax planning is a legitimate exercise of prudence, it cannot be carried out
through the use of 'colourable devices' or 'subterfuges' and that it is wrong to
encourage a belief in the legitimacy of such methods.' It is evident from the words
of the judgment' that the Court, in fact, merely sought to respond the appellant's
argument, and relied on a number of cases for this purpose. It was not a definitive
pronouncement on the specific delineation of what is and is not permissible in
seeking to reduce one's tax liability.
5

6

See McDowell, supra note 1, at 1 15.
The Court considered a number of judgments in support of the Appellant's
contention. However, it found no support for the proposition that every instance of
tax planning or avoidance was permissible and that any analysis of the device
used for the reduction of tax liability, despite its legal validity, is beyond the scope
of the court. See McDowell, supra note 1, at 23-25.
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Indeed, it is submitted, the observation implies that the Court was referring
not to a determination of the merits of any method of tax planning etc., but to the
desirable line of analysis that courts must undertake in order to make such a
determination. Therefore, the 'rule'" in McDowell, properly understood, was that
the nature of the analysis to be undertaken by the Court in order to determine whether
a transaction is permissible as a measure to reduce one's tax liability is to examine
whether the device used for such reduction is 'colourable' or 'dubious' or amounts
to a 'subterfuge'. To elaborate, the Court did not make any determination of what
kind of transactions would be permissible or impermissible, but answered the
question how a court must go about making such a determination.
However, it is also necessary to address the observations of Reddy J. and
ascertain their relevance to tax governance. The main thrust of the opinion was
that although traditional legal doctrine has given wide berth to the various
methods of reducing tax liability, the law in England, where this doctrine was
first evolved, has changed and therefore it is necessary for courts to go beyond a
formal analysis of transactions and ascertain whether the transaction is intended
to serve as a tax-avoidance measure. If it is so intended, then it must be disregarded
and its effect must not be allowed to confer any advantage on the assessee. Any
measure taken with intent to reduce tax liability, and having this effect, is unlawful
and cannot be given effect by the courts. While this position was sought to be
supported by the change in the position of law in England, purportedly brought
about by the increasing instances of tax evasion, eminent jurist N.A. Palkhivala
makes a compelling argument that in fact, no such change occurred in England.9
Palkhivala points that not only is the opinion based on an incorrect reading and
application of English case law, but that in any event the traditional position has
now been restored in England.o To this end, he points out that in fact, Azadi may
be considered a'parallel' development in India as that of Macniven v. Westmoreland
Investments Ltd.n [hereinafter"Macniven"] in England and therefore, neither the
observations of Reddy J. nor the cases cited by him are relevant anymore.

See McDowell, supra note 1, at

10

2

1 26.

The term 'rule' is not used to refer to the ratio decidendi of the case. The 'rule' in
McDowell is merely meant to signify the position of law, observed in that case,
insofar as it is relevant to address the question of tax evasion.
See PALKHIVALA, supra note 2, at 65.
The learned authors refer to the decisions in Craven v. White, (1988) 3 All ER 495
(H.L.) (U.K.) and Macnivcn v. Westmoreland Investments Ltd., (2001) 1 All ER 865 (H.L.)
(U.K.) to demonstrate this point. See PALKHIVALA, supra note 2, at 65.
Macniven v. Westmoreland Investments Ltd., (2001) 1 All ER 865 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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Therefore, it becomes evident that the observations of Reddy J. are perhaps
not only unsound and irrelevant in the context of the position of law today, but
do not make any contribution to the law on the question of tax avoidance and
evasion, because of their non-authoritative legal effect as a concurring
judgment. Indeed, the lack of relevance of his observations received judicial
recognition in Azadi, where it was conclusively stated that the concurring
opinion was not entirely consistent with the majority and therefore not relevant
for consideration.12
Now, the natural question arises as to why McDowell is relevant at all; if the
rule in McDowell is only a guide for courts to proceed and if the concurring
judgment is irrelevant, then why must it be considered significant at all? The
answer, it is submitted, lies in the broad contours of the debate on tax governance
and the emerging legislative and judicial measures to address the question of tax
evasion. The relevance of McDowell may be in the fact that courts considering the
merits of the different lines of approach that may be taken to delineate the
permissible from the impermissible will require to consider the opinion of Reddy,
J. and the'transaction purpose' analysis espoused by it. Furthermore, the McDowell
rule as explained in this paper is relevant to contextualize seemingly divergent
judgments such as those of Vodafone and Azadi and to characterize them in a
common light, as will be discussed subsequently.
Having stated that McDowell is relevant, inter-alia, as an important marker
in the treatment of tax-reducing transactions, it is now pertinent to examine the
delineations that inform the tax evasion debate with a view to understanding
the location of McDowell, Azadi, Vodafone and the DTC in the landscape of the debate.
At the outset, it may be pointed out that while the analysis undertaken by courts
has revolved around the interpretation of the purpose or the legal and economic
effect of the transaction in question, such analysis cannot meaningfully proceed
in a vacuum, i.e., without consideration of the yardstick to which such transaction
must conform. While courts have not expressly addressed the question of the
interpretation of the statute as a relevant consideration to determine whether
the offending transaction is to be disregarded, this analysis, it is submitted, is
central to such determination. Although courts have, in arriving at their decision,
sought to understand the position of law laid down by the relevant statute, it is
submitted that this aspect requires more serious consideration to reach any
12

See Azadi, supra note 3, at

130.
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meaningful finding on the validity of questionable transactions and, furthermore,
that courts ought to clearly articulate this aspect so as not to obscure its significance
in arriving at the ultimate decision."
From this perspective, there are broadly two conflicting approaches that
may be adopted; the textualist and the purposivist approach. 14 In essence, the
textualist approach requires that the true nature of any transaction be examined
in relation to the permissible standard laid down by the express words of the
relevant taxing statute. In other words, as long as a transaction falls within the
words of the statute, it should be regarded as a wholesome transaction and the
law confers the full benefit of such a transaction to the assessee. This approach is
embodied in the traditional treatment of questionable transactions, as seen in a
number of cases following the Duke of Westminster v. Inland Revenue" [hereinafter
"Westminster""] and the FischersExecutors'" [hereinafter"Fischers"]reasoning. It is
submitted that the most striking feature in all these cases seems to be their
emphasis on the commercial freedom of parties to transact in any manner
permissible by the letter of the law and thereby avoid or reduce their tax liability
by availing of the benefits conferred by the law. This approach has even been
taken to allow parties the freedom to take advantage of the inadequacies in the
letter of the law with a view to reducing their tax liability. 7
The purposivist approach, on the other hand, requires taxing statutes to be
interpreted in light of their avowed purpose, whereby courts may depart from
the express words of the statute to determine the 'spirit' of the law, which is then
enforced as the legal standard to judge the transaction in question. The purposivist
approach is often informed by an attempt to answer the question as to what was
the true purpose of the transaction. If the purpose of the transaction falls beyond
the spirit of the statute, i.e., beyond the pale of legitimate purposes that the statute
was created to serve, then it cannot be given effect and must be disregarded as an
"

1

"
16
'7

Indeed, writers have emphatically drawn attention to the interpretation of the
statute as the central consideration in determining whether a transaction must be
disregarded for the purpose of taxation. For instance, see K.B. Brown, Substance Over

Form Theory in U.S. and U.K. Tax Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L &COMP. L. REV. 169, 173 (1992).
See generally J. Freeman,Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and The Intention of
Parliament,123 L. Q. REV. 53 (2007); C. Evans, Barriersto Avoidance: Recent Legislative
and Judicial Developments in Common Law Jurisdictions,37 H. K .L. J. 103 (2007); A.D.
Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-Over-FormDoctrines in Tax Law,
43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 699 (2003).
Duke of Westminster v. Inland Revenue, 19 T.C. 490 (H.L.) (U.K.).
Inland Revenue Comissioners v. Fischer's Executors, 1926 AC 395 (H.L.) (U.K.).
See McDowell, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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attempt to circumvent the law. Another significant aspect of the purposivist
approach is that its analysis is often accompanied by an invocation to a sense of
moral sanction purportedly entrenched within taxing statutes.18
Clearly, therefore, the opinion of Reddy J. in McDowell would fall within the
purposivist approach. Similarly, the dicta of Lord Wilberforce in Ramsayl9 as well
as those of Lord Diplock, Lord Scarman and Lord Roskill in Burmah Oil20 and other
often-cited cases entail an analysis of the intended effect of the transaction on the
tax liability of the assessees and its comparison with the purpose of the statute as
interpreted by their Lordships.
Now, the DTC contains specific tax evasion provisions and imposes a'general
anti-avoidance rule'. Section 112 of the DTC provides for the declaration of any
'arrangement' as an 'impermissible avoidance arrangement' and allows the
Revenue to determine the consequences of such an arrangement by disregarding
or re-characterizing it or altogether considering it void. Section 113(14) defines
'impermissible avoidance arrangement' in relation to its purpose, as well as its
effect.21 Clearly, therefore, the DTC also adopts a firmly purposivist approach,
providing that any arrangement entered into with a view to obtaining a tax
benefit and having an 'atypical' effect, is liable to be disregarded.
It must be noted, at this juncture, that one of the main problems with the
application of this dichotomy between textualism and purposivism is that each
approach emerges as a knee-jerk reaction to the other. It is submitted that tax
evasion is unquestionably a major concern in tax governance; neither courts nor
the legislature can afford to ignore it. However, in an effort to find the 'silver
bullet',' courts and the legislature seem to have a tendency to adhere to either
1s

19
20
21

22

See Viscount Simon LC, Latilla v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1943) T.C. 107
(H.L.) (U.K.), Cf McDowell, supra note 1, at 125.
W.T. Ramsay v. IR, 54 T.C. 101 (H.L.) (U.K.).
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., 54 T.C. 200 (H.L.) (U.K.).
The sub-section provides that if the purpose of the arrangement is to obtain some
tax benefit and its effect is wither the creation of rights or obligations not normally
entered into in 'arms-length' transactions, or lacking 'commercial substance', or
the carrying out of such an arrangement in a manner resulting in 'abuse of the
provisions' of the Code or not bona fide, then it shall be treated as an 'impermissible
avoidance agreement'

See M.A. Chirelstein and L.A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Searchfor the Silver Bullet,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005). The authors discuss the continual legislative and

administrative efforts to curtail the rampant use of tax shelters in the U.S., and
conclude that the 'silver bullet' may not be found in narrowly tailored legislative
responses to specific tax shelter, but in the 'disallowance of non-economic loss'
approach suggested by them.
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one of these approaches in response to the failure of the other. For instance, it may
be observed that courts in the U.S. are seeking to move towards a narrow approach
in order to mitigate the ill effects of wide purposivism, 23 and the traditional rule
of textualism in India and the U.K. has, in recent times, faced strong opposition in
the form of judicial and legislative developments such as McDowell and the DTC.
Indeed, this effect is evident even in the writings of scholars who have gone to the
extent of characterizing fiscal statutes as 'beneficial' or 'welfare' legislation and
have argued that a correspondingly suitable interpretation must be place upon
them. 24 Therefore, there seems to be a need for a more tempered approach to
enable courts and the legislature to take effective measures against tax evasion,
rather than the extreme approach hitherto adopted.
It is this context that the author seeks to analyse the approach of the Supreme
Court in Vodafone and Azadi. It must be remembered that Azadi can be considered
as the bulwark of the current position on tax evasion, and has been given the
distinction of having "set the law in the right perspective" in India. 2 Now, in
Vodafone, the Bombay High Court, upholding the show-cause notice issued to the
petitioners, made a determination on the nature of the transaction, for the limited
purpose of determining that the notice was not altogether non-est,26 on two grounds.
First, the transaction was not merely a transfer of shares resulting in a transfer of
the controlling interest of the Cayman Islands entity in its Indian subsidiary, but
was in fact a transfer of the underlying assets of that subsidiary. Any profit arising
from the business of the subsidiary would be considered as the profit of the transferee
and not merely the profit of the 'shell company', and would therefore be liable to

23

24

25
26

See Learned Hand J., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2nd Cir. 1934). The
dictum of the Learned Judge in this case expressly narrowed down the scope of
analysis to exclude consideration of "a desire to avoid or evade taxes", to "...whether
what was done.. .was the thing which the statute intended". Cf G.W. Miller, Corporatc
Tax Shelters and Economic Substance: An Analysis of the Problem and its Common Law
Solution, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1015 (2003). While the judgment of Hand J.is considered
epoch-making for its evolution of the 'economic substance' doctrine, it is plainly
evident that the Learned Judge wished to minimize the consideration of the legitimacy
of the taxpayer's purpose and attached importance to legislative intent.
H.R. Saviprasad, Evasion of Taxes and the Judiciary,110 TAXMAN 57,60 (2000) [hereinafter
"Saviprasad"]. The author brings out the fallacious argument that fiscal statutes
must be interpreted in light of their purpose, as envisaged by the Directive
Principles, which accords them the position of welfare legislation. The fallacy in
the argument is that it completely ignores the fundamental principle of strict
interpretation of fiscal statutes, which does not allow for any such treatment.
PALKHIVALA, supra note 2, at 65.

Therefore, the determination of the true nature of the transaction is not a binding ratio,
as it was merely incidental to the decision on the validity of the show-cause notice.
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tax as 'capital gains' in India. Secondly, the Court held that even without 'piercing
the veil' and considering the assets of the subsidiary as the subject of the transfer, a
mere transfer of the controlling interest implied a transfer of a number of valuable
intangible assets such as the right to carry on business and operate mobile telephony
in India, which transfer was taxable in India.
In arriving at these findings, the Court was largely influenced by two
considerations; the legal substance of the transaction 27 and the scope of
transactions intended to be covered by the statute." In Azadi again, the Court
proceeded on an analysis of the'purpose and consequence' of the Double Taxation
Avoidance Convention, along with a reading of the provisions of the Income Tax
Act, relevant to the subject of Double Taxation Relief.29 Therefore, in both the
above cases, the court read the provisions of the relevant statutes, interpreting
them in the context of the meaning of the words intended by Parliament, and
applied such interpretation to the substance of the transaction in question to arrive
at a conclusion as to whether the transaction fell foul of the statute so interpreted.
It is submitted that this approach, which has been called 'purposive textualism'
in the context of similar U.K. and U.S. cases, 0 provides the much needed 'midway
path' approach to be adopted by courts in the analysis of transactions for the
purpose of determining their wholesomeness in the context of tax evasion.
In fact, Srikrishna J. specifically brought out this line of reasoning in Azadi,
while rejecting the observations of Reddy J. in McDowell as an "extreme view
which.. militates against the observations of the majority."3 Citing the dictum
of Lord Keith in Craven v. White, he observed that the analysis does not involve
any determination on the basis of the intention of the taxpayer in undertaking
the transaction in question, but must involve a determination of the 'real' nature
of the transaction on a construction of the relevant provision of the statute.3 2 This
proposition is best explained by Lord Hoffman in the landmark Macniven decision,
27
28

29

3o

31
32

See Vodafone, supra note 4, at ' 159.
See Vodafone, supra note 4, at 151-153, 159.
The Supreme Court determined that section 90 of the Income Tax Act was
introduced with the intention of allowing the Central Government to enter into
agreements with foreign countries for the purpose of the avoidance of double
taxation and that the provisions of the Convention and the Act must be read in this
context. See Azadi, supra note 3, at 1 13-26.
See S.S. Schumacher, Macniven and Tax Advice: Using Purposive Textualism to Deal
With Tax Shelters and Promote Legitimate Income Tax Advice, 92 MARQ. L. REv. 33 (2008).
Azadi, supra note 3, at 1 130.
See Craven v. White, (1988) 3 All ER 495 (H.L.) (U.K.), at 524.
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which he later elaborated upon in his scholarly piece? His Lordship observed
that in the determination of a transaction as a 'real' transaction, the court must
stay clear of "unnecessary philosophical difficulties about the nature of reality"
and that the 'reality' of transactions must be viewed solely in the context of the

statute. 34
Hence, it is submitted that the analysis brought to light in Azadi and Vodafone
is neither purely purposive nor strictly textualist in approach; it seeks to construe
the provisions of the statute in light of their intended meaning by the legislature,
and apply that standard to interpret the transaction. It is pertinent, at this juncture,
to revert to Palkhivala's observation on the current state of the law on tax evasion.
While observing that Azadi has set the record straight from the "temporary
turbulence created in the wake of McDowell,"35 the learned authors make the crucial
observation that the judicial reaction to McDowell was to reject the sweeping
observations of the concurring opinion in that case and to distance the Court's
position from those observations.3 6 They further observe that the spate of judgments
delivered in opposition to McDowell "make the time extremely ripe for an Indian
parallel to Macniven", 7 which has in fact consummated in the form of Azadi.

3
3

3
36

L. Hoffman, Tax Avoidance, 2 B.T. R. 197 (2005).
To elaborate, his Lordship used the example of 'real income' and observed that in
labelling transactions as 'sham' transactions, the court accepts certain 'juristic
categorizations' as intended to be converted by the statute, and that subsequently
holding that although the transaction is not a 'sham', it is still not a 'real' transaction
results in a rejection of the accepted juristic categorization and misleads the court to
rely on alternative categorizations of what is 'real'. See Azadi, supra note 3, at 1 132.
PALKHIVALA, supra note 2, at 66.
For instance, Sabyasachi Mukherjee J., in two judgments following McDowcll,
namely, CWT v. Arvind Narottam, 173 ITR 479 (Supreme Court of India) and Union of
India v. Playworld Electronics, 184 ITR 308 (Supreme Court of India) forcefully
dismissed the observations of Reddy J. as 'moral sermons' and warned that "one

should avoid subverting the rule of law" Cf PALKHIVALA, supra note 2, at 64. It is
interesting to note that this, and similar reactions in Valiappan v. ITO, 170 ITR 238
(High Court of Madras), at 280 and Banyan and Bcrry v. CIT, 222 ITR 831 (High Court
of Gujarat), at 850, bear an uncanny resemblance to the reaction to the strongly
'anti-tax avoidance' dissent of Viscount Simon, LC in Latilla v. IRC, [1943] 1 All ER
265 (H.L.) (U.K.), where for instance Jordan, C.J. in the Australian case of B. Vicars,
[1944] 45 SCR (NSW) 85, attacked the opinion of Viscount Simon, observing that
"The courts should... not be concerned with the morality or desirability of the
course taken but only in the legal position and the legal consequences" Cf.
Saviprasad, supra note 24, at 59. It is submitted that this resemblance points to the
inevitable phenomenon of knee-jerk reactions against both extreme views as pointed
out earlier, and is perhaps indicative of the desirability of moving towards a median
3

standard, as, it will be argued, is being done by the courts in India.
PALKHIVALA, supra note 2, at 65.
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Now, therefore, it is submitted that the movement of judicial opinion away
from the purposivist position of Reddy J.in McDowell must not be seen as merely
a cumulative reaction to the extreme view taken in that case, but must be seen as
a steady movement towards the more desirable 'purposive textualist' approach,
clearly adopted by Azadi as well as Macniven. Thus, reading the progression of
cases as a single line of development towards this approach beginning from the
actual 'rule in McDowell' as enunciated in this paper," resulting in the Azadi

approach and continuing through Vodafone, courts may find a useful pattern to be
applied in subsequent cases. This reading, it is submitted, will enable courts to
find ample support for the proposition that the approach of 'purposive textualism'
is indeed a desirable one and has in fact been developing in the reasoning
underlying a series of cases, including Vodafone.
Indeed, it is submitted that not only does this serve as a guiding principle
for courts, but must also be given serious consideration by the legislature. The
current position adopted by the DTC is yet another example of the knee-jerk
reaction against a perceived relaxation of standards in Azadi. What must be kept
in mind is that Azadi is not merely a reversion to the strict textualist approach of
Westminster, but entails a more nuanced and, it is submitted, more desirable
approach. It may be noted that the distinction between 'rules' and 'standards' is
relevant for the legislature; while rules lay down specific modes of acceptable
behaviour, standards prescribe 'ends' which may be achieved through any mode
of conduct.39 Tax governance, it is submitted, requires both rules and standards
and to this end, the adoption of the suggested approach by the DTC will serve to
bring its objective to fruition.
In conclusion, some observations may be made about the merits of the
approach suggested in this paper. In the foregoing discussion, it has been argued
that the line of cases from McDowell to Azadi and continuing up to Vodafone must
be read in light of the principle of 'purposive textualism' as an instrument of
analysis, and that the same must be adopted by the DTC. Now, it is submitted
that this approach has two merits. Firstly, it provides a valuable compass for
38

3

The author refers to the rule laid down by the court in relation to the nature
of
analysis to which the transaction must be subject, i.e., to the extent that it is not a
'dubious' or 'colourable' exercise, and removed from any consideration of the
'purpose' of the transaction. This 'rule', as sought to be enunciated by the author
not be confused with the ratio of the case, or the sweeping observations made in

the concurring opinion of Reddy J.
See E.P. Fitzgerald, The Economic Substance Doctrine: Rules and Standards,17 FED. CIR. B.
REV. 529, 531 (2008).
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judicial analysis and, in addition to being based on sound reasoning,0 completely
avoids dangerous reactions associated with textualism and purposivism.
Secondly, and more importantly, it provides a clear standard for lawyers while
advising clients. To elaborate, it has been observed that the standard of conduct
prescribed for tax lawyers in advising clients on tax planning strategies is closely
related to the applicable legal standards which their stratagems may be subject
to. Their standard of conduct, in turn, is closely related to the amount of reliance
corporations are willing to place on the strategies suggested by their lawyers,
and therefore, is a significant determinant in the behaviour of corporations. If,
therefore, the purpose of tax governance is, in some sense, "to change people's
attitude towards tax avoidance", as suggested by Sabhyasachi Mukherjee J.,4 1
then perhaps the approach suggested in this paper will go a long way in achieving
this purpose.

40

41

The author refers to the reasoning of the court in Craven v. White and that of Lord
Hoffman in Macniven, which can be considered as the theoretical origins of the
principle.
CWT v. Arvind Narottam, 173 ITR 749 (Supreme Court of India) (Per Sabhyasachi
Mukherjee, J.). Cf. PALKHIVALA, supra note 2, at 64.
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